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This supplementary document contains a formal analysis of some of the extensions brieﬂy
discussed in Section 5 of the published version. Section A1 considers the game in which agents
receive signals about the size of past attacks. Section A2 considers the game with observable
shocks to the fundamentals. Section A3 considers the variant in which agents observe the
shocks with a one-period lag. Section A4 considers the game with short-lived agents in which
the fundamentals follow a random walk. Finally, Section A5 collects the proofs of the formal
results contained in this document.
A1. Signals about past attacks
For some applications, it might be natural to assume that agents collect information–either private
or public–not only about the underlying fundamentals but also about the size of past attacks. To
capture this possibility, we extend the game with public news examined in Section 5.1 as follows.
In every period t ≥ 2, agents receive private and public signals about the size of the attack in the
previous period. These signals are, respectively,
˜ Xit = S(At−1, ˜ ξit) and ˜ Zt = S(At−1, ˜ εt),
where ˜ ξit is idiosyncratic noise, ˜ εt is common noise, and S :[ 0 ,1] × R → R. To preserve Normality
of the information structure, we adopt a speciﬁcation similar to that in Dasgupta (2002):
˜ ξit ∼ N (0,1/γx
t ), ˜ εt ∼ N (0,1/γz
t ), and S (A,υ)=
(
Φ−1 (A)+υ if A ∈ (0,1),
υ otherwise.
1The noises ˜ ξit and ˜ εt guarantee that, even if A(θ) is monotonic, the fundamentals θ never become
common certainty among the agents.1
Since in any equilibrium of the game, agents play in period 1 as in the static benchmark,
the size of attack in period 1 is given by A1 (θ)=Φ(
√
β1 (x∗
1 − θ)),w h e r ex∗
1 =ˆ x1.T h i s i m -




1 − θ)+˜ ξi2 and ˜ Z2 =
√
β1 (x∗
1 − θ)+˜ ε2. The posterior beliefs about θ conditional on
(˜ x2, ˜ z2, ˜ X2, ˜ Z2) are then Normal with mean
β2
β2+α2x2 + α2
































β2 = β1 + ηx
2 + β1γx
2 and α2 = α1 + ηz
2 + β1γz
2,
with x1,z 1,β 1 and α1 deﬁned as in the previous sections. That is, x2 and z2 are suﬃcient statistics
for (˜ x2, ˜ X2) and (˜ z2, ˜ Z2) with respect to θ. If the agents’ strategies in period 2 are monotonic in
(˜ x2, ˜ X2), then the size of attack and hence the regime outcome in that period are decreasing in θ,
which in turn implies that the agents’ strategies in period 2 are necessarily a threshold strategy
in the statistic x2. A similar argument applies to every t ≥ 2:in any monotone equilibrium, the





































βt = βt−1 + ηx
t + 1t−1βt−1γx
t and αt = αt−1 + ηz
t + 1t−1βt−1γz
t ;
where 1t−1 is an indicator function that takes value 1 if At−1 ∈ (0,1) and 0 otherwise, and x∗
t−1
is the threshold played in period t − 1. It follows that the conditions in Proposition 3 continue to
characterize the entire set of monotone equilibria–the only diﬀerence is that the statistics xt and
zt are now endogenous, as deﬁned above, and that the thresholds x∗
t and θ∗
t are now functions, not
only of zt, but also of ˜ Zt.
The multiplicity result of Theorem 2 thus extends directly to this environment. Similarly, the
structure of dynamics remains the same as in the game with public news, except for the property
that an unsuccessful attack does not necessarily reduce the incentives for further attacks. This is
because an unsuccessful attack now also generates new private and public signals, which in some
cases may oﬀs e tt h ei m p a c to ft h ek n o w l e d g et h a tt h er e g i m es u r v i v e dp a s ta t t a c k s .T os e et h i s ,
1We assume that these signals are uninformative when A =0or A =1to avoid the possibility that agents can
detect (collective) deviations. Since agents are inﬁnitesimal, this would not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes, but would
require us to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs.




t =0 ), in which case the only
novel eﬀect is that an unsuccessful attack leads to an endogenous increase in βt.Af u r t h e ra t t a c k
is then possible only if this increase is large enough, like in the benchmark game. On the other
hand, when the endogenous signal is public (γz
t > 0=γx
t ), a new attack becomes possible if this
signal is low enough, like in the case with exogenous public news. Signals about the size of past
attacks can thus substitute for the exogenous arrival of private and public information and lead to
“snow-balling eﬀects” where new attacks become possible immediately after unsuccessful ones.
A2. Observable shocks
Consider the game with observable shocks described in Section 5.3 of the paper. The characteriza-
tion of monotone equilibria was completed there. Here we prove that “essentially” all equilibria of
the benchmark game Γ(0) can be approximated by equilibria of the game with observable shocks
Γ(δ),f o rδ small enough (This result was discussed at the end of Section 5.3 without proof).
As in the case with unobservable shocks (Theorem 3 in the paper), we rule out knife-edge
equilibria where U is tangent to the horizontal axis. But, unlike that case, convergence is established
in probability, for the equilibrium thresholds here are functions of the sequences of observable
shocks.
Proposition A1 For any ε>0 and T<∞,t h e r ee x i s t sδ (ε,T) > 0 such that the following is
true for all δ<δ(ε,T):




t=1 of Γ(0),f o rw h i c hθ∗
















t=1 of Γ(δ) such that
Pr






¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε ∀t ∈ {1,...,T}
´
≥ 1 − ε.
A3. Shocks observable with lag
In this section, we discuss a variant of the game with shocks in which agents observe the shocks
with a one-period lag. This variant was brieﬂy discussed at the end of Section 5.3.
The game structure is the same as in the model with fully observable shocks (Section 5.3),
except that ωt becomes known only at the end of period t. The property that the contemporaneous
shock is unobservable introduces an additional source of uncertainty about the regime outcome in
the current period and may even reintroduce the lower-dominance region. At the same time, the
property that the shock is revealed at the end of the period ensures that the learning induced by
the knowledge that the regime survived past attacks continues to take the simple and sharp form
of a truncation in the support of the agents’ beliefs about θ, as in the case with fully observable
shocks.
3Equilibrium characterization, multiplicity and dynamics. Monotone equilibria are now


















;n o t et h a ts t r a t e g i e s
in period t are contingent only on ωt−1 since ωt is not observed at the time agents choose whether
or not to attack, but the regime outcome still depends on ωt, since ωt directly aﬀects the size of
attack necessary for regime change.
To compute the expected net payoﬀ from attacking, we need to adjust the conditional prob-
ability of regime change as follows. For a given threshold rule ¯ xt, regime change occurs in pe-
riod t when the fundamentals are θ i fa n do n l yi fθ + δωt ≤ Φ
¡√
βt (¯ xt − θ)
¢
, or equivalently
ωt ≤ ¯ ωδ








/δ. Conditional on θ, the probability of regime change in
period t is therefore given by
pδ
t (θ;¯ xt) ≡ Pr
³









The updating of posterior beliefs, on the other hand, is the same as in the game with fully




¯ xt − ¯ θt
¢¢
. Next, consider























, with ¯ θ0 = −∞ and ω0 =0 . When agents




t=1, posterior beliefs over θ in period t are again








denote the c.d.f. of an agent’s posterior about θ conditional on having



























¶¶ if θ>¯ θt−1
0 if θ ≤ ¯ θt−1
which is exactly the same as in the benchmark model. Next, let vδ
t
¡
x, ¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢
denote an agent’s
expected net payoﬀ from attacking in period t when he has suﬃcient statistic x ∈ R,a l lo t h e r
agents follow monotone strategies in that period with threshold ¯ xt ∈ R, and the agent believes that
































x, ¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢




¯ xt, ¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢




x, ¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢
if ¯ xt = −∞
.
V δ
t is the analogue of the function U in the benchmark model: it represents the net payoﬀ from
attacking in period t for the marginal agent with threshold ¯ xt.
4Since vδ
t is continuous in x, ¯ xt and ¯ θt−1, V δ
t is continuous in ¯ xt and ¯ θt−1 for all ¯ xt ∈ R.M o r e o v e r ,
since vδ
t is bounded and monotone decreasing in x, for any given ¯ xt, V δ
t
¡
¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢
is well-deﬁned at
¯ xt = ±∞. We thus have the following equilibrium characterization.
Proposition A2 {at (·)}∞




















(ii) for t =1 ,x ∗
1 ∈ R solves V δ
1 (x∗
1,−∞)=0 ;a n dθ∗
1 (ω1)=¯ θt (x∗
1,δω 1).


















































An equilibrium always exists.
The equilibrium characterization is thus similar to that with observable shocks; one only has
to adjust the agents’ expected payoﬀ from attacking to take into account the uncertainty about the
regime outcome introduced by unobservable contemporaneous shocks.
As δ → 0, the impact of shocks on regime outcomes vanishes, thus ensuring a similar conver-
gence result as the one we established in the previous section for the case with observable shocks.
Proposition A3 For any ε>0 and T<∞,t h e r ee x i s t sδ (ε,T) > 0 such that the following is
true for all δ<δ(ε,T):




t=1 of Γ(0) for which θ∗
















t=1 of Γ(δ) such that
Pr






¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε ∀t ∈ {1,...,T}
´
≥ 1 − ε.
A4. Changing fundamentals with short-lived agents
In Section 5.5 we introduced and brieﬂy analyzed a game with short-lived agents where the “funda-
mentals” (summarized by the critical size of attack necessary for regime change) follow a random
walk. Here we prove that Proposition 5 and Theorem 3, which we established for the case with long-
lived agents and unobservable shocks, apply also to this game. To keep the analysis self-contained,
we ﬁrst brieﬂy revisit the description of the game and the characterization of beliefs and payoﬀs
that is in Section 5.5.
The game. A regime change occurs in period t if and only if At ≥ ht,w h e r eht follows a
Gaussian random walk: h1 = θ ∼ N(z,1/α) and ht = ht−1 +δωt for t ≥ 2, with ωt ∼ N(0,1), i.i.d.
across time and independent of θ. Once the status quo is abandoned, the game is over. As long as
the status quo is in place, a new cohort of agents replaces the old one in each period; each cohort
is of measure 1 and lives exactly one period. Agents who are born in period t must choose whether
or not to attack the status quo, after receiving private signals xit = ht+ξit, where ξit ∼ N (0,1/βt)
5is i.i.d. across agents and independent of hs for any s 6= t. Payoﬀs are as in the benchmark model:
the net payoﬀ from attacking in period t is 1−c if the status quo is abandoned in that period and
−c otherwise, while the payoﬀ from not attacking is zero.





the c.d.f. of the common posterior in period t about ht, when agents in earlier cohorts attacked
in periods τ ≤ t − 1 i fa n do n l yi fxτ < ¯ xτ. When earlier cohorts followed such strategies,
the status quo survived period τ i fa n do n l yi fhτ > ¯ θτ (¯ xτ), where ¯ θτ (¯ xτ) is the solution to
Φ
¡√
βτ (¯ xτ − hτ)
¢






























denote the c.d.f. of private posterior



































¡¯ θ1 (¯ x1)|x
¢







¡¯ θt (¯ xt)|x;¯ xt−1¢
− c























if ¯ xt = −∞
(A3)
The following then provides the algorithm for characterizing monotone equilibria.
Proposition A4 For any δ>0, {at (·)}∞
t=1 is a monotone equilibrium for Γ(δ) if and only if




(i) for all t, at (·)=1if xt <x ∗
t and at (·)=0if xt >x ∗
t,
(ii) for t =1 ,x ∗
1 ∈ R and V δ
1 (x∗
1)=0 ,
(iii) for any t ≥ 2, either x∗










An equilibrium exists for any δ>0.2
Finally, the next result establishes that essentially any equilibrium of the benchmark game can
be approximated by an equilibrium of the random-walk game for δ small enough.









characterizing the associated regime outcomes is simply given by h
∗
t = ¯ θt (x
∗
t) for any t ≥ 1.
6Proposition A5 For any ε>0 and any T<∞,t h e r ee x i s t sδ (ε,T) > 0 such that the following
is true for all δ<δ(ε,T):
For any equilibrium {x∗
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(0) such that x∗





for all t ∈ {2,...,T},
there exists an equilibrium {xδ
t}∞
t=1 of Γ(δ) such that, for all t ≤ T, either |x∗
t − xδ
t| <ε ,o r
x∗
t = −∞and xδ
t < −1/ε.
A5. Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 1 .To establish Proposition A1, we ﬁrst prove the following weaker
claim:
Result A1.a For any ε>0, any T<∞, and any sequence {θ∗
t}
T
t=1 that is part of an equi-
librium of Γ(0) a n ds u c ht h a tθ∗





for all t ≤ T, there exists a






















¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε, ∀t ∈ {1,...,T}
´
≥ 1 − ε. (A4)
Given Result A1.a, the stronger result in the proposition then follows by letting δ(ε,T) be







across all diﬀerent sequences {θ∗
t}
T
t=1 that can be part of an
equilibrium of Γ(0); that δ(ε,T) > 0 is ensured by the fact that the set of such sequences is ﬁnite
for any ﬁnite T<∞.
To prove Result A1.a, we proceed in four steps, using an argument based on induction: step 1
shows that the result holds for T =1 ; step 2 provides a suﬃcient condition for the result to hold
for T conditional on holding for T − 1; steps 3 and 4 prove that this condition is satisﬁed both for
the case where θ∗
T = θ∗
T−1 (step 3) and for the case where θ∗
T >θ ∗
T−1 (step 4).
To simplify notation, let Ω ≡ δω, and for any t ≥ 1 and any
¡¯ θt, ¯ θt−1,Ω
¢
such that ¯ θt ≥ ¯ θt−1
and Ω ∈
£
−¯ θt,1 − ¯ θt
¤
, deﬁne Vt
¡¯ θt, ¯ θt−1,Ω
¢
≡ U

















t=1 ∈ RT :
¯
¯¯ θt − θ0
t
¯
¯ ≤ ε, ∀t =1 ,...,T
o
.
Step 1. By Propositions 1 and 4, the (unique) ﬁrst-period equilibrium threshold θ∗
1 of Γ(0)
satisﬁes V1 (θ∗
1,−∞,0) = 0, while the (also unique) ﬁrst-period equilibrium threshold θδ






=0 .M o r e o v e r , s i n c e U
¡¯ θ,−∞,β 1,α,z
¢
is continuous and strictly
decreasing in both ¯ θ and z, V1
¡¯ θ,−∞,Ω
¢
is also continuous and strictly decreasing in both ¯ θ and Ω.
From the deﬁnition of V and of θ∗
1, we thus have that V1 (θ∗
1 − ε,−∞,0) > 0 >V 1 (θ∗
1 − ε,−∞,ε).
It follows that there exists ¯ Ω ∈ (0,ε) such that V1
¡
θ∗
1 − ε,−∞, ¯ Ω
¢






1 − ε. Likewise, V1 (θ∗
1 + ε,−∞,0) < 0 <V 1 (θ∗
1 + ε,−∞,−ε) and hence there exists Ω ∈ (−ε,0)
such that V1 (θ∗






is continuous and strictly decreasing in both ¯ θ1 and Ω, θδ
1 (ω1) is continuous
and decreasing in ω1.H e n c e θδ
1 (ω1) ∈ [θ∗
1 − ε,θ∗




.T h e r e
7thus exists an equilibrium of Γ(δ) for which
¯ ¯θδ
1 (ω1) − θ∗
1






























Ω/ˆ δ, ¯ Ω/ˆ δ
i´
=1− ε and Pr
¡¯ ¯θδ
1 (ω1) − θ∗
1
¯ ¯ ≤ ε
¢
≥ 1 − ε for all δ ≤ ˆ δ, which proves the
claim for T =1 .


































≥ 1 − ε1. (A5)
Now suppose further that we are able to prove that the following is true.
Result A1.b For any ε>0 and any sequence {θ∗
t}
T
t=1 that is part of an equilibrium of Γ(0),
there exists an ε1 ∈ (0,ε) and a ˆ δ ≤ ˆ δ−1 such that for any δ ∈ (0, ˆ δ), there exists an equilibrium of















¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε|ωT−1) ≥ 1 − ε + ε1.



































































































≥ (1 − ε1)(1 − ε + ε1)
> 1 − ε,
implying that Result A1.a holds also for T.
To complete the proof of Result A1.a, it thus suﬃces to show that Result A1.b holds. We do
so by proving the following:
Result A1.c There exist scalars ε1 ∈ (0,ε), Ω < 0 < ¯ Ω, ˜ δ>0, a n daf u n c t i o nˆ θT : R2 → R such
that the following hold:






























and any δ<˜ δ, Pr










We prove Result A1.c in the next two steps, distinguishing the case where θ∗
T = θ∗
T−1 (step
3) and where θ∗
T >θ ∗














t=1 be the equilibrium of Γ(δ) whose sequence of

















Step 3. Suppose that θ∗
T = θ∗
T−1, and pick any ε1 ∈ (0,ε) such that θ∗
T−1 − ε1 > 0. Then,















be the highest solution to VT
³
ˆ θT, ¯ θT−1,Ω
´











































Since ¯ θT−1 ≥ θ∗









is strictly decreasing in δ and converges










implying part (ii) is satisﬁed for all δ ≤ ˜ δ. Hence, Result A1.c is satisﬁed for the case θ∗
T = θ∗
T−1.
Step 4. Next assume that θ∗
T >θ ∗














(An analogous argument applies if VT is strictly increasing in such a neighborhood,
whereas the case that VT is locally non-monotonic is ruled out by the non-tangency assumption).
Then, by the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists ε0 ∈ (0,ε], Ω0 < 0 < ¯ Ω0 and a function ˆ θT :








=0for any (Ω, ¯ θT−1) ∈ [Ω0, ¯ Ω0]×[θ∗
T−1−ε0,θ∗
T−1+ε0].




satisﬁes part (i) of Result A1.c by construction. To see
when it also satisﬁes part (ii), note that, by the continuity of VT, ˆ θT is also continuous, and hence











∈ [Ω, ¯ Ω] × [θ∗
T−1 − ε1,θ∗
T−1 + ε1]. Since ε2 ≤ ε0 ≤ ε, it follows that, whenever







































is decreasing in δ and converges to 1 as δ → 0,t h e r ee x i s t s






≥ 1−ε+ε1 for all δ ≤ ˜ δ, which establishes part (ii) of Result
A1.c.
9P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 2 .The result follows from exactly the same arguments as the proof
of Proposition 5 in the main text, after adjusting the notation for beliefs. (Note that, unlike in
the case of Proposition 5, here there is no need to prove convergence of beliefs: the belief updating
induced by any given monotone strategy is identical to that in the benchmark model.)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 3 .As in the proof of Proposition A1, it suﬃces to prove the weaker









¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢
≡ U
¡¯ θt (¯ xt), ¯ θt−1,β t,α,z
¢
as δ → 0, where ¯ θt (¯ xt) ≡ ¯ θt (¯ xt,0). Steps
2-5 then use this property to prove the result with an induction argument similar to the one in the
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 1 .
Step 1. The proof that V δ
t converges pointwise to V 0
t as δ → 0 is similar to Step 1 in the
proof of Theorem 3 in the paper; it is actually simpliﬁed by the fact that the equilibrium updating
of beliefs here is identical to that in the benchmark model and hence follows directly from the





t (θ;¯ xt) ≡
(
1 if θ ≤ ¯ θt (¯ xt),
0 if θ>¯ θt (¯ xt).




























¯ xt, ¯ θt−1
¢
.
Step 2. Here we show that Result A1.a holds for T =1 .F i x ε>0. In period 1,t h e
game in which shocks are observable with a lag is isomorphic to the game in which shocks are
never observable. Therefore, for any η>0, step 2 of Theorem 3 in the paper implies imme-





















deﬁne ¯ Ω(¯ x1) and Ω(¯ x1) implicitly by ¯ θ1
¡
¯ x1, ¯ Ω
¢
= θ∗
1 − ε and ¯ θ1 (¯ x1,Ω)=θ∗
























.C l e a r l y ,¯ Ω(x∗
1) > 0 > Ω(x∗
1),a n d






























is decreasing in δ and converges to 1 as δ → 0, there exists
















≥ 1 − ε for all δ ≤ δ00. We conclude that Result
A1.a holds for T =1with ˆ δ(ε,1) = min{δ00,δ0 (η1)}.
Step 3. Along the same lines as in step 2 in the proof of Proposition A1, we now establish
as u ﬃcient condition for Result A1.a to hold for T periods when it holds for T − 1 periods. In
particular, ﬁxa nε>0, an ε1 ∈ (0,ε), a T ≥ 2, and a sequence {θ∗
t}
T
t=1 that is part of an







> 0 such that,










t=1 of Γ(δ) that satisﬁes the
result for T − 1 and ε1. Suppose further that we are able to prove the following:
Result A2.c There exist scalars ε1 ∈ (0,ε), ˜ δ>0, such that, for any δ<˜ δ, there exists a function
ˆ xT : R → R that satisﬁed the following:






, either ˆ xT
¡¯ θT−1
¢





























¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε
´
≥ 1−ε+ε1,w h e r eˆ θT















Then, for any δ<min{ˆ δ−1, ˜ δ}, there exists an equilibrium of Γ(δ) that satisﬁes the result for






























. But then, by the same argument as















≥ 1 − ε,
proving that the result holds for T with ˆ δ =m i n {ˆ δ−1, ˜ δ}. In the next two steps, we thus prove
Result A2.c, distinguishing again between the case where θ∗
T = θ∗




Step 4. Suppose that θ∗
T = θ∗









































− c. Now, select ε1 ∈ (0,ε) and ˜ δ1 > 0 such that
θ∗





/˜ δ1) − c ≤ 0. Whenever δ ≤ ˜ δ1 and
¯ ¯¯ θT−1 − θ∗
T−1















/˜ δ1) − c ≤ 0.
Therefore, whenever δ ≤ ˜ δ1, ˆ xT
¡¯ θT−1
¢
















. To check that part (ii) is also




= ¯ θT−1, and hence






¯ ¯ ¯ ≤
ε1 <ε . Therefore,
Pr































.S i n c e θ∗










≥ 1 − ε + ε1 for all δ ≤ ˜ δ2. Hence, Result A2.c is satisﬁed whenever δ ≤ ˜ δ ≡
min{˜ δ1, ˜ δ2}.
11Step 5. Suppose now that θ∗
T >θ ∗
T−1,a n dﬁx ε>0 and ε0 ∈ (0,ε] such that θ∗
T−1 + ε0 <
θ∗
T − ε0. Suppose further that V 0
t is locally decreasing in ¯ xT at ¯ xT = x∗















for all η ≤ η1 (An analogous argument applies if V 0
T is
locally increasing, while tangency is ruled out by assumption).
>From the pointwise convergence of V δ
T to V 0
t , for any η ∈ (0,η 1], there exists δ1 (η) > 0,s u c h














.B yc o n t i n u i t yw i t hr e s p e c t
to θ∗































T + η, ¯ θT−1
¢
for all ¯ θT−1 such that
¯ ¯¯ θT−1 − θ∗
T−1
¯ ¯ ≤ ε1 (η) and all δ ≤ δ1 (η). Therefore, whenever δ ≤ δ1 (η),













=0 , in which case part
(i) of Result A2.c is satisﬁed for ε1 (η) and ˜ δ ≤ δ1 (η), for any η ≤ η1.
To check when part (ii) is also satisﬁed, note that ¯ θT (¯ xT,Ω) ∈ [θ∗
T − ε0,θ∗
T + ε0] if and only
if Ω ∈ [ΩT (θ∗
T + ε0, ¯ xT),ΩT (θ∗
T − ε0, ¯ xT)],w h e r eΩT (θ, ¯ x) ≡ Φ
¡√









































.M o r e o v e r ,¯ θT (¯ xT,Ω) ∈ [θ∗
T − ε,θ∗
T + ε] for
all ¯ xT ∈ [x∗
T − η,x∗













T + ε], when-
ever Ω ∈ [ΩT (θ∗
T + ε,x∗
T + η),ΩT (θ∗
T − ε,x∗
T − η)]. We conclude that
Pr






¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ ε
´
≥ Pr





















T − ε0,x ∗
T − η
¢¤¢
for all ¯ θT−1 such that
¯
¯¯ θT−1 − θ∗
T−1
¯




T) > 0 >
ΩT (θ∗
T + ε,x∗
T),w eh a v eΩT (θ∗
T − ε,x∗
T − η2) > 0 > ΩT (θ∗
T + ε,x∗
T + η2) for some η2 ∈ (0,η 1],a n d
there exists δ2 (η2) > 0 such that, for all δ ≤ δ2 (η2),
Pr(ωT ∈ [ΩT (θ∗
T + ε,x∗
T + η2)/δ,ΩT (θ∗
T − ε,x∗
T − η2)/δ]) ≥ 1 − ε + ε1 (η).
Therefore, part (ii) of Result A2.c is satisﬁed with ε1 = ε1 (η2) and ˜ δ =m i n{δ1 (η2),δ 2 (η2)}.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 4 .Since ﬁrst-period beliefs are identical to those in the benchmark
game, V δ
1 (¯ x1)=V 0
1 (¯ x1) for all ¯ x1 ∈ R, and therefore x∗
1 =ˆ x1 and h∗
1 = ˆ θ1,w h e r e(ˆ x1, ˆ θ1) denote
the ﬁrst-period equilibrium thresholds of the benchmark game. The rest of the proof then follows






= −c<0 for all ¯ xt−1 ∈ R
t−1 (which rules out equilibria in which x∗
t =+ ∞), notice
that for ¯ xt =+ ∞,a n df o ra n yx>1,
Ψδ
t

































P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o nA 5 .Below we establish that, as δ → 0, beliefs and hence payoﬀsi n
the game with short-lived agents converge pointwise to those in the benchmark model. Given the
converge of payoﬀs ,t h er e s u l tt h e nf o l l o w sf r o mt h es a m ea r g u m e n t sa si nS t e p s2 - 4i nt h ep r o o f
of Theorem 3.










common posterior about ht in the game with changing fundamentals and short-lived agents. The











α(z − ¯ θt (¯ xt−1))
¢,
while the latter are deﬁned by (A1) (Recall that ¯ θt
¡
¯ xt−1¢
≡ min{θ : θ ≥ Φ
¡√
βτ (¯ xτ − θ)
¢
∀τ ≤
t} =m a x τ≤t
©¯ θτ (¯ xτ)
ª


























for the benchmark model, and similarly (replacing Ψ0
t with Ψδ
t) for the game with for the game
with changing fundamentals (Clearly, the above deﬁnitions and conditions apply to t ≥ 2; similar
ones hold for t =1 ).
To prove pointwise convergence of private posteriors, it thus suﬃces to prove pointwise conver-
gence of the common posteriors. We establish this by induction. Clearly, since period 1 is identical

































z − ¯ θt−2(¯ xt−2)
¢¢ > 0 if ht > ¯ θt−2(¯ xt−2)
for all ht and ¯ xt−2. Using the above together the fact that limδ→0 Φ((ht − ht−1)/δ)=1whenever











0 if ht ≤ ¯ θt−1(¯ xt−1)
R ht












13for all ht and ¯ xt−1, which proves the pointwise converge of posteriors in period t.
Next, consider payoﬀs. In the benchmark model, ﬁrst-period payoﬀss a t i s f y
V 0
1 (¯ x1)=U




¡¯ θ1 (¯ x1)|¯ x1
¢
− c ∀¯ x1 ∈ R,




¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
= U







¡¯ θt (¯ xt)|¯ xt;¯ xt−1¢
− c ∀¯ xt ∈ R, ¯ xt−1 ∈ R
t−1.
In the game with changing fundamentals, ﬁrst-period beliefs are identical to those in the bench-




¡¯ θ1 (¯ x1)|¯ x1
¢
− c = Ψ0
1
¡¯ θ1 (¯ x1)|¯ x1
¢
− c = V 0
1 (¯ x1) ∀¯ xt ∈ R.








¡¯ θt (¯ xt)|¯ xt;¯ xt−1¢
− c ∀¯ xt ∈ R, ¯ xt−1 ∈ R
t−1,t ≥ 2.












¡¯ θt (¯ xt)|¯ xt;¯ xt−1¢
− c = V 0
t
¡
¯ xt−1, ¯ xt
¢
∀¯ xt ∈ R, ¯ xt−1 ∈ R
t−1,t ≥ 2.
Note that convergence of beliefs and payoﬀsm a yf a i la t¯ xt = −∞, but, as in the case of Theorem
3, this does not aﬀect the result.
14